Abstract. Block cipher ARIA was first proposed by some South Korean experts in 2003, and later, it was established as a Korean Standard block cipher algorithm by Korean Agency for Technology and Standards. In this paper, we focus on the security evaluation of ARIA block cipher against the recent zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis. In addition, Partial-sum technique and FFT (Fast Fourier Transform) technique are used to speed up the cryptanalysis, respectively.
Introduction
ARIA [1] is a block cipher designed by a group of Korean experts in 2003. In 2004, ARIA was established as a Korean Standard block cipher algorithm by the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy. ARIA is a general-purpose involutional SPN(substitution permutation network) block cipher algorithm, optimized for both lightweight environments and hardware implementation. ARIA supports 128-bit block length with the key sizes of 128/192/256 bits, and the most interesting characteristic is its involution based on the special usage of neighbouring confusion layer and involutional diffusion layer.
The security of ARIA has been internally evaluated by the designers [1] with differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis, truncated differential cryptanalysis, impossible differential [2] performed an evaluation of ARIA with truncated differential cryptanalysis and dedicated linear cryptanalysis. For the first time, Wu et al. [3] found a non-trivial 4-round impossible differentials and they gave a attack on 6-round ARIA requiring about 2 121 chosen plaintexts and 2 112 encryptions. Based on some properties of the binary matrix used in the diffusion layer, Li et al. [4] found some new 4-round impossible differentials of ARIA, and they gave an efficient attack on 6-round ARIA. Later, Fleischmann et al. [5] proposed the boomerang attack on 6-round ARIA and the integral attack [6] was introduced in the analysis of 7-round ARIA. Tang et al. [7] proposed the meet-in-the-middle attack on 7-round ARIA. Du et al. [8] proposed the impossible differentials on 7-round ARIA-256 and recently, Xie et al. [9] gave some improvements. Attack results on ARIA are summarized in Table 1 .
Zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis [10] was proposed by Bogdanov and Rijmen, which has its theoretical foundation in the availability of numerous key-independent unbiased linear approximations with correlation zero for many ciphers. However, the initial distinguisher of [10] had some limitations in terms of data complexity, which needs at least half of the codebook. In FSE 2012, Bogdanov and Wang [11] proposed a more data-efficient distinguisher by making use of multiple linear approximations with zero-correlation. Although the date complexity is reduced, the distinguisher relies on the assumption that all linear approximations with zero-correlation are independent. At AsiaCrypt 2012 [12] , a multidimensional distinguisher has been constructed for the zero-correlation property, which removed the unnecessary independency assumptions. Recently, zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis has been using in the attack of block ciphers CAST-256 [12] , Camellia [13] , CLEFIA [13] , HIGHT [14] , LBlock [15] and E2 [16] , successfully.
Some improving techniques for zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis have been proposed, such as the partial-sum technique and FFT technique. Ferguson et al. [17] proposed the partial-sum technique in 2000 and they applied the technique to the integral attacks on 6-round AES. The basic idea of Partial-sum technique is to partially compute the sum by guessing each key one after another instead of guessing the all keys one time. Since zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis use enormous plaintexts-ciphertexts pairs, Partial-sum technique can also be used to reduce the computation complexity in the attack procedure.
FFT-based technique of computational complexity reduction was first proposed by Collard et al. [18] in the linear attack on the AES candidate Serpent in 2007. It also relies on eliminating the redundant computations from the partial encryption/decryption in attack process. At SAC 2013, Bogdanov et al. [13] applied FFT technique to the zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis of Camellia.
In this paper, 4-round zero-correlation linear approximations of ARIA are discussed in detail. Furthermore, we investigate the security of 6/7-round ARIA-128/256 with both Partialsum and FFT techniques. Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
1. We reveal some 4-round zero-correlation linear approximations of ARIA. If we treat the input/output masks as the input/output differentials, they are 4-round impossible differentials of ARIA owing that the diffusion layer of the round function is a diagonal matrix.
2. Based on those new linear approximations with zero-correlation, key-recovery attacks on 6/7-round ARIA-128/256 are proposed. In addition, we use Partial-sum technique and FFT technique to speed up the attacks. To my knowledge, they are the first zero-correlation linear attacks on reduced-round ARIA.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief description of block cipher ARIA and outlines the ideas of zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis. Some new zero-correlation linear approximations are shown in Section 3. Section 4 and Section 5 illustrate our attacks on 6/7-round ARIA-128/256 with Partial-sum and FFT technique, respectively. We conclude in Section 6.
Preliminarise

Description of ARIA
ARIA is an SPN style block cipher and the number of the rounds are 12/14/16 corresponding to key of 128/192/256 bits. The round function constitutes 3 basic operations: the substitution layer, the diffusion layer and the round key addition, which can be described as follows:
Round Key Addition(KA) : This is done by XORing the 128-bit round key, which is derived from the cipher key by means of the key schedule.
Substitution Layer(SL) : Applying the 8 × 8 S-boxes 16 times in parallel on each byte. There are two types of substitution layers to be used so as to make the cipher involution, see Figure 1 . For convenience, we denote by S r,k , S −1 r,k the k-th S-box of r-th round and its inverse S-box. 
Note that the diffusion layer of the last round is replaced by a round key addition. We shall assume that the 6/7-round ARIA also has the diffusion layer replaced by a round key addition in the attack of 6/7-round ARIA. In addition, our attacks do not utilize the key relation, we omit the details of ARIA's key schedule.
Basic ideas of zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis
In this section, we briefly recall the basic concepts of zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis based on [10] , [11] and [12] . Linear cryptanalysis is based on linear approximations determined by input mask a and output mask β. A linear approximation a → β of a vectorial function f has a correlation denoted by
where we denote the scalar product of binary vectors by a · x = ⊕ n i=1 a i x i . In zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis, the distinguisher uses linear approximations with zero correlation for all keys while the classical linear cryptanalysis utilizes linear approximations with correlation as far from zero as possible. Zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis with multiple linear approximations was introduced in [11] .
Let the number of available zero-correlation linear approximations for an n-bit block cipher be denoted by l. Let the number of required known plaintexts be N . For each of the l given linear approximations, the adversary computes the number T i of times that linear approximation i is fulfilled on N plaintexts and ciphertexts, i ∈ {1, ..., l}. Each T i suggests an empirical correlation valueĉ i = 2T i /N − 1. Under a statistical independency assumption, l i=0ĉ 2 i follows a X 2 -distribution with mean µ 0 = l/N and variance σ 2 0 = 2l/N 2 for the right key guess, while for the wrong key guess, it follows a X 2 -distribution with mean µ 1 = l/N +l/2 n and standard deviation
If we denote the probability of false positives and the probability of false negatives to distinguish between a wrong key and a right key as β 1 and β 0 , respectively, and we consider the decision threshold τ = µ 0 + σ 0 z 1−β 0 = µ 1 − σ 1 z 1−β 1 , then the number of known plaintexts N should be approximately:
where z 1−β 0 and z 1−β 1 are the respective quantiles of the standard normal distribution. Recently, Bogdanov et al. [12] proposed a multidimensional zero-correlation linear distinguisher using l zero-correlation linear approximations to remove the statistical independency assumption, which requires O(2 n / √ l) known plaintexts, where n is the block size of a cipher. We treat the zero-correlation linear approximations available as a linear space spanned by m base zero-correlation linear approximations such that all l = 2 m − 1 non-zero linear combinations of them have zero correlation. For each of the 2 m data values z ∈ F m 2 , the attacker initializes a counter V [z], z = 0, 1, ..., 2 m − 1 to value zero. Then, for each distinct plaintext, the attacker computes the corresponding data value in F m 2 by evaluating the m basis linear approximations and increments the counter V [z] of this data value by one. Then the attacker computes the statistic T :
The statistic T follows a X 2 -distribution with mean µ 0 = (l − 1)
2 for the right key guess, while for the wrong key guess, it follows a X 2 -distribution with mean µ 1 = l − 1 and variance σ 2 1 = 2(l − 1). If we denote the probability of false positives and the probability of false negatives to distinguish between a wrong key and a right key as β 0 and β 1 , respectively, and we consider the decision threshold τ = µ 0 + σ 0 z 1−β 0 = µ 1 − σ 1 z 1−β 1 , then the number of known plaintexts N should be about In this section, we show some zero-correlation linear approximations for 4-round ARIA, following the properties on the propagation of linear masks over basic block cipher operations proposed in [10] . We consider the 4-round linear approximations with zero-correlation, which is built in a miss-in-the-middle manner. Some 2-round linear approximations with nonzero bias is concatenated to some 2-round linear approximations with nonzero bias in the inverse direction, where the intermediate masks states contradict with each other. We assert that the 4-round linear approximations
have zero-correlation, where b and h denote any non-zero value.
Consider that the input masks (0, 0, 0, 0, b, 0, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) will result that the input mask for R 2 is (e 0 , e 1 , ..., e 14 , e 15 ) in the forward direction, where e i , 0 ≤ i ≤ 15 denotes a unknown value. The three bytes e 3 , e 4 , e 10 satisfy that e 3 ⊕ e 4 ⊕ e 10 = d 5 = 0. In the backward direction, we can get that the input mask of R 4 is (g 0 , g 1 , ..., g 14 , g 15 ) from the output (0, 0, h, 0, 0, h, 0, 0; 0, 0, 0, h, h, 0, 0, 0) where g i , 0 ≤ i ≤ 15 also denotes a unknown value. Then, we have g 3 = 0, g 4 = 0, g 10 = 0, which leads that g 3 ⊕ g 4 ⊕ g 10 = 0 and it contradicts with d 5 = 0. As a result, the linear hull is a zero-correlation linear hull, see In addition, the linear map P of diffusion layer is a diagonal matrix. If we treat the input/output masks as the input/output differentials, they are also 4-round impossible differentials.
4 Key-recovery attacks on 6-round ARIA with Partial-Sum and FFT In this section, based on the first 4-round zero-correlation linear approximates, we present some key-recovery attacks on 6-round ARIA-128 with zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis. In the attack process, the Partial-sum and FFT techniques are used to speed up, respectively.
Key-recovery attacks on 6-round ARIA with Partial-sum technique
To attack 6-round ARIA, the 4-round linear approximates with zero-correlation start from round 2 and end at round 5. One round is added before and one round is appended after the linear approximates, refer to Figure 3 . The partial encryption and decryption using the partial sum technique are proceeded as follows. The following steps in the partial encryption and decryption phase are similar to Step 2, we use Table 2 to show the details of each partial encryption and decryption step. In Table 2 , the second column stands for the counters should be allocated in this step. The subkey bytes that have to be guessed in each step are shown in the third column. the fourth column denotes the time complexity of corresponding step measured in 1/16 × 1/6 6-round encryption. The intermediate state values are shown in the last column. In this attack, we set the type-I error probability β 0 = 2 −2.7 and the type-II error probability β 1 = 2 −90 . We have z 1−β 0 ≈ 1, z 1−β 1 ≈ 11, n = 128, l = 2 16 . According to Equation ( 2) The date complex N is about 2 123.6 and the decision threshold τ ≈ 2 15.9 .
There are 88-bit key values guessed during the encryption phase, and only the right key candidates survive in the wrong key filtration. The complexity of Step 3 to Step 12 is no more than 2 108.6 6-round ARIA encryptions and the complexity of Step 1 is about 2 121 6-round ARIA encryptions which is also the dominant part of our attack. In total, the data complexity is about 2 123.6 known plaintexts, the time complexity is about 2 121 6-round ARIA encryptions and the memory requirement are about 2 90.3 byte for counters.
Key-recovery attack on 6-round ARIA with FFT technique
Using the FFT technique, we can attack 6-round AIRA-128 starting from the first round by placing the 4-round zero-correlation linear approximations in rounds 2 to 5. One round is added before and one round is appended after the linear approximates, also see Figure 3 .
In our attack, we guess the subkey and evaluate the linear approximation ( 
Our attack is equivalent to evaluating the correlation of the linear approximation v = 0. The correlation of the linear approximation v = 0 can be evaluated as the matrix vector product where the matrix is: [2, 5, 11, 12] and increment the counters x i according to the value of i.
3. For each of the 2 16 linear approximations, (i). Perform the key counting phase and compute the first column of M using (3) and (4). As M is a 88-level circulant matrix, this information is sufficient to define M completely , which requires 2 88 operations.
(ii). Evaluate the vector = M · x, which requires about 3 × 88 × 2 88 operations.
(iii). Let W = W + ( /N ) 2 , If W < τ , then the corresponding K is a possible subkey candidate and all master keys are tested exhaustively.
After
Step 3, we obtain 2 88 counters V K which are the sum of squares of correlations for 2 16 linear approximations under each k. The correct subkey is then selected from the candidates with V K less than the threshold τ If we set β 0 = 2 −2.7 and β 1 = 2 −90 , we get z 1−β 0 ≈ 1 and z 1−β 1 ≈ 11. Since the block size n = 128 and we have l = 2 16 linear approximations, according to Equation (1), the number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs N should be about 2 124.1 and the threshold τ ≈ 2 −108.4 . In Step 3, only the right guess is expected to survive for the 88-bit target subkey. The complexities for Step 2, Step 3, are 2 121.5 memory accesses, 2 16 × 4 × 88 × 2 88 = 2 112.5 operators, respectively. If we assume that one time of memory access, one time of operators, one 6-round Camellia encryption are equivalent, then the total time complexity is about 2 121.5 encryptions. The memory requirements are about 2 90.3 bytes. In this section, we describe some zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis of 7-round ARIA. The attack is based on the first 4-round zero-correlation linear approximates with additional one round in the begin and two rounds at the end, see Fig.4 . Partial-Sum and FFT are also used in the attack process, respectively.
Key-recovery attacks on 7-round ARIA with Partial-sum technique
Similarly to the attacks to 6-round ARIA, the partial encryption and decryption using the partial sum technique are proceeded as follows. [1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15] and initialize them to zero. For the corresponding ciphertexts after 7 round encryption, extract the value of x 1 and increment the corresponding counter
. The time complexity of this step is N memory accesses to process the chosen P C pairs. We assume that processing each P C pair is equivalent to one round encryption, then the time complexity of this step is about N × 1/7 7-round encryptions.
2 
The computation in this step is no more than N ×2 72 ×1/16×1/7 7-round encryptions. Similarly, we use Table 3 to show the details of each partial encryption and decryption step, where we let k 7,2 = ⊕ i=1, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 15 ), if T < τ ,then the guessed key is a possible key candidate. We do exhaustive search for all keys conforming to this possible key candidate.
In this attack, we set the type-I error probability β 0 = 2 −2.7 and the type-II error probability β 1 = 2 −186 . We have z 1−β 0 ≈ 1, z 1−β 1 ≈ 15.7, n = 128, l = 2 16 . According to Equation (2), the date complex N is about 2 124.6 and the decision threshold τ ≈ 2 15.9 .
There are 184-bit key values guessed during the encryption phase, and only the right key candidates survive in the wrong key filtration. The complexity of Step 3 to Step 16 is no more than 2 203.5 7-round ARIA encryptions and In total, the data complexity is about 2 124.6 known plaintexts, the time complexity is about 2 203.5 7-round ARIA encryptions and the memory requirement are about 2 152 byte for counters.
Key-recovery attack on 7-round ARIA with FFT technique
In our attack, one round is added before and two rounds are appended after the linear approximates with zero-correlation from rounds 2 to 5, see 3, 4, 7, 9, 12, 14 [12] , and v = u ⊕ b · K 6 , then we have
Our attack is equivalent to evaluating the correlation of the linear approximation v = 0, which can be evaluated as the matrix vector product where the matrix is: 0, 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 15]|m 8 [1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 
Then the attack is performed as follows: [1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15] , increment the counters x i according to the value of i.
3. For each of the 2 16 linear approximations, (i). Perform the key counting phase and compute the first column of M using (5) and (6) . As M is a 184-level circulant matrix, this information is sufficient to define M completely , which requires 2 184 operations.
(ii). Evaluate the vector = M · x, which requires about 3 × 184 × 2 184 operations.
After
Step 3, we obtain 2 184 counters V K which are the sum of squares of correlations for 2 16 linear approximations under each k. The correct subkey is then selected from the candidates with V K less than the threshold τ If we set β 0 = 2 −2.7 and β 1 = 2 −186 , we get z 1−β 0 ≈ 1 and z 1−β 1 ≈ 15.7. Since the block size n = 128 and we have l = 2 16 linear approximations, according to Equation (1), the number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs N should be about 2 124.7 and the threshold τ ≈ 2 −108.4 . In Step 3, only the right guess is expected to survive for the 184-bit target subkey. The complexities for Step 2, Step 3, are 2 121.9 memory accesses, 2 16 × 4 × 184 × 2 184 = 2 209.5 operators, respectively. If we assume that one time of memory access, one time of operators, one 7-round Camellia encryption are equivalent, then the total time complexity is about 2 209.5 encryptions. The memory requirements are about 2 152 bytes.
Conclusion
In this paper, we evaluate the security of ARIA block cipher with respect to the technique of zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis. We deduce some 4-round zero-correlation linear approximations of ARIA, and based on those linear approximations, we give some key-recovery attacks on 6/7 round ARIA-128/256 with the Partial-sum technique and FFT technique taken into consideration. For the first time, we consider the security of ARIA against zerocorrelation linear cryptanalysis. While two techniques are used in the attack, it also gives us a chance to compare the partial-sum technique and the FFT technique.
